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Evidence-Based Jurisprudence Meets Legal 
Linguistics—Unlikely Blends Made in Germany 
Hanjo Hamann† & Friedemann Vogel‡ * 
German legal thinking is renowned for its hair-splittingly 
sophisticated dogmatism. Yet, some of its other contributions to research 
are frequently overlooked, both at home and abroad. Two such secondary 
streams recently coalesced into a new corpus-based research approach to 
legal practice: Empirical legal research (which had already developed in 
Germany by 1913) and research on language and law (following 
German pragmatist philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein’s work of 1953). 
This Article introduces both research traditions in their current 
German incarnations (Evidence-Based Jurisprudence and Legal 
Linguistics) and shows how three common features—their pragmatist 
observation of social practices, their interest in dissecting legal 
authority, and their big data strategy—inspired a new, corpus-based 
research agenda, Computer Assisted Legal Linguistics (CAL²). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
When one can no longer hide behind empirical uncertainties, one is 
compelled to state one’s normative preferences. . . . Ergo, and 
somewhat ironically, the more positive knowledge there is, the more 
and better the law’s normative work will be. 
—Michael Saks1 
Corpus research in law is inherently interdisciplinary. It differs 
from traditional legal research in two important features: 
methodologically, it relies on big data empiricism rather than 
doctrinal analysis; substantially, it treats language not merely as the 
medium but as the object of study. Both of these features have been 
central to intellectual traditions originating some hundred years 
ago—which ought to be acknowledged, analyzed, and adapted for 
the field as a whole to progress. This is where some work remains to 
be done, and this Article attempts to do it. 
Nowadays, empirical legal research in the United States exerts 
notable influence overseas, e.g., in Germany.2 According to its most 
 
 1.  Personal letters quoted in Peter H. Schuck, Why Don’t Law Professors Do More 
Empirical Research?, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 323, 335 (1989). 
 2.  See the dedication in HANJO HAMANN, EVIDENZBASIERTE JURISPRUDENZ: 
METHODEN EMPIRISCHER FORSCHUNG UND IHR ERKENNTNISWERT FÜR DAS RECHT AM 
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popular origins narrative, this “new empiricism” traces its roots “to 
the original Legal Realist movement of the 1930s”.3 Yet, even that 
may not be looking back far enough. In Germany, a popular 
type  of  legal empirical inquiry called legal fact research 
(Rechtstatsachenforschung) was in full swing by the early 1910s. 
Although this methodology did not go unnoticed by contemporary 
U.S. scholarship, it was never fully appreciated. 
Regarding research on language and law, no origins narrative 
seems yet to have been proposed in the United States.4 In Germany, 
where research on language and law arguably got its earliest 
academic coverage, the most important treatise on language 
pragmatics (which seeded German research on language and law) 
dates from the early 1950s. This contribution, too, is commonly 
overlooked both in international (U.S.-centered) discourse and in 
German academia proper. 
Revisiting these early origins will enable us to trace their 
trajectory into the current German research programs called 
Evidence-Based Jurisprudence (Part II) and Legal Linguistics (Part 
III), respectively. This will help us understand the intellectual 
underpinnings of corpus research in Germany and may inform the 
U.S. discourse as well. As a future perspective, we will also show how 
both traditions recently coalesced into a new transdiscipline that 
combines big data corpus research with its own epistemological 
focus on the language of legal practice, distinct from the plain 
meaning and original intent traditions: Computer Assisted Legal 
Linguistics (CAL²) (Part IV). 
 
BEISPIEL DES GESELLSCHAFTSRECHTS p. V (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2014) [hereinafter 
EVIDENZBASIERTE JURISPRUDENZ] (“to the memory of Theodore Eisenberg,” who had 
founded the Empirical Legal Studies [ELS] movement and passed away in the year of the 
book’s publication). 
 3.  Mark C. Suchman & Elizabeth Mertz, Toward a New Legal Empiricism: Empirical 
Legal Studies and New Legal Realism, 6 ANN. REV. LAW & SOC. SCI. 555, 556–57 (2010). 
 4.  However, Peter M. Tiersma came close in A History of the Languages of Law, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND LAW 13 (Peter M. Tiersma & Lawrence M. 
Solan eds., 2012). See also Stephen C. Mouritsen, Corpus Linguistics in Legal Interpretation—
An Evolving Interpretive Framework, 6 INT. J. LANG. & LAW 67 (2017). 
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II. EVIDENCE-BASED JURISPRUDENCE 
Evidence-Based Jurisprudence is a moniker for one of the most 
recent empirical research programs in Germany. While the terms 
“evidence-basing” and “law” were used in conjunction only rather 
recently (section B), their intellectual history stretches back into the 
early twentieth century (section A). Nowadays, this research develops 
an explicitly pragmatic account of legal empiricism that raises 
epistemological questions as well (section C). 
A. Origins: Genuinely “Legal” Empirical Studies 
One of the most influential forerunners of empirical work in U.S. 
jurisprudence is surely law and economics. As an over-quoted quip 
has it, “the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master 
of economics.”5 Judging by this quote and its popularity, it would 
seem that even from the very start, statistical methods of 
(quantitative) empirical research were tied up inextricably with the 
theory of economic analysis. 
Yet in German-speaking countries, while economic analysis of 
law started even earlier than in the United States,6 the German 
variety of economic analysis never monopolized statistics 
(“econometrics”) to the extent it did in the United States. Instead, 
another tradition came to be regarded as the touchstone of empirical 
inquiry, legal fact research (Rechtstatsachenforschung),7 which both 
fed on and further fueled “a thorough change” of German legal 
methods at the onset of the twentieth century: 
 
 5.  Oliver W. Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). 
 6.  See Izhak Englard, Victor Mataja’s Liability for Damages from an Economic 
Viewpoint: A Centennial to an Ignored Economic Analysis of Tort, 10 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 
173 (1990) (discussing Mataja’s 1888 book, Das Recht des Schadensersatzes vom Standpunkte 
der Nationalökonomie); Kristoffel Grechenig & Martin Gelter, The Transatlantic Divergence in 
Legal Thought: American Law and Economics vs. German Doctrinalism, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 295, 325–40 (2008) (citing an even earlier law and economics monograph by 
Friedrich Kleinwächter [1883], as well as work following Mataja’s by lawyer-turned-
economics-professor Anton Menger [1890], and the German inventor of “principal-agent” 
and “nexus of contracts” reasoning, Erwin Steinitzer [1908]). 
 7.  Arthur Nussbaum, Fact Research in Law, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 189, 207 (1940) 
[hereinafter Fact Research in Law] (Nussbaum’s terminology notwithstanding, we translate 
Rechtstatsachenforschung as “Legal Fact Research” for purposes of readability. Both terms 
are synonymous.). 
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Observation of the law from within has been integrated by 
observation from without . . . . Thus, two sets of facts are to be 
taken into account: the life situations to be regulated, and the 
politics and evaluations guiding the regulating activities. To know 
them both, the jurist must put himself outside of the body of the 
existing rules. He must closely observe the facts of life, economics 
and other social phenomena.8 
One of the earliest pioneers of this new “observation from 
without” methodology before World War I was practicing lawyer, 
and soon to turn law professor, Arthur Nussbaum. Nussbaum 
advocated empirical research as a remedy to the “empty dogmatism” 
of German legal academia, of which he claimed his contemporaries 
had grown “weary.”9 He called for the “systematical scientific 
processing and comprehensive acquisition” of “a certain body of 
inductively discoverable facts . . . which have to be known to fully 
appreciate and properly apply legal norms”—in short, “legal facts” 
(Rechtstatsachen).10 While this approach did not fully anticipate the 
theoretical premises of the later “legal realism” movement (which 
denied the existence of applicable legal norms in the first place), it 
did anticipate much of legal realism’s methodology—as Nussbaum 
realized when he defined legal fact research as 
the systematic search into the social, political and other fact 
conditions which give rise to the individual legal rules, and 
examination of the social, political and other effects of those 
rules. . . . No contest or doubt exists as to the necessity and 
urgency of such research among the various groups of realists, 
American or non-American. It is a first principle of realism of 
all shades.11 
 
 8.  Max Rheinstein, Comparative Law and Conflict of Laws in Germany, 2 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 232, 251–53 (1935). 
 9.  ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, DIE RECHTSTATSACHENFORSCHUNG. IHRE BEDEUTUNG 
FÜR WISSENSCHAFT UND UNTERRICHT 1 (J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], Tübingen 1914) 
[hereinafter DIE RECHTSTATSACHENFORSCHUNG] (“man ist der leeren Dogmatik überdrüssig 
geworden”). Other excerpts are translated to English in Elliott E. Cheatham et al., Arthur 
Nussbaum: A Tribute, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1957) (explaining just “how revolutionary 
Nussbaum’s approach . . . was”). 
 10.  DIE RECHTSTATSACHENFORSCHUNG, supra note 9, at 3, 6, 8. 
 11.  Fact Research in Law, supra note 7, at 197 (also calling legal fact research 
“definitely a phase of the realistic movement”); Cheatham et al., supra note 9, at 1 (noting 
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With legal fact research slightly preceding the other legal realist 
movements, it spurred plenty of follow-up research in Germany12 
and equally infused the U.S. literature of its day.13 Even though its 
dissemination was tragically cut short by “the immediately following 
disasters, war, revolution, inflation, deflation, social trouble and 
again revolution,”14 it was later revisited and persists in Germany to 
this day.15 
Equally persistent is the original disdain that legal fact research 
harbored for sophisticated statistics16 and for causal inquiry in 
general.17 Nussbaum envisioned a genuinely legal empirical research 
 
that Nussbaum was “in the forefront of those who preached and practiced a new approach to 
the study of law: . . . the search for a more realistic approach . . . in which economic and social 
facts formed an integral part of legal doctrine and principle”). For other German “shades of 
realism,” see Rheinstein, supra note 8, at 251 (citing examples as early as 1903 for 
“[d]iscussions similar to those now going on here in the United States between traditionalists, 
legal sociologists and realists”). 
 12.  See Cheatham et al., supra note 9, at 4 (“Among them were studies on cartels, sales 
and leases, international commercial transactions, standard contracts, which have become 
classics.”); Fact Research in Law, supra note 7, at 198; Robert A. Riegert, Empirical Research 
About Law: The German Picture, with Comparisons and Observations, 2 DICK. INT’L L. ANN. 1 
(1983), elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr/vol2/iss1/2. 
 13.  Prior to Nussbaum’s own reflections, see supra note 7, other authors who had taken 
note included Henning Holm-Nielson, The Law of Torts in Denmark, 15 J. COMP. LEGIS. & 
INT’L L. 3D SER. 176 (1933); Henning Holm-Nielson, The Problem of Wage Earner 
Bankruptcies and its English Solution, 9 J. NAT’L ASS’N REF. BANKR. 103 (1935); Sidney B. 
Jacoby, Some Realism About Judicial Statistics, 25 VA. L. REV. 528, 529 (1939); Edouard 
Lambert & Max J. Wasserman, The Case Method in Canada and the Possibilities of its 
Adaptation to the Civil Law, 39 YALE L.J. 1, 18 (1929); Rheinstein, supra note 8, at 251. 
 14.  Holm-Nielson, Wage Earner Bankruptcies, supra note 13, at 106; see Cheatham et 
al., supra note 9, at 4 (“[Nussbaum’s] venture was cut short by the advent of the 
Nazi regime.”). 
 15.  See the recent survey by HAMANN, supra note 2, at 40–45, the monograph series 
by Duncker & Humblot publishers, SCHRIFTENREIHE ZUR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE UND 
RECHTSTATSACHENFORSCHUNG (2014) (ninety-six total volumes), and the series by JWV 
publishing house, EMPIRISCHE STUDIEN ZUM DEUTSCHEN UND EUROPÄISCHEN 
UNTERNEHMENSRECHT (2017) (fourteen volumes). 
 16.  Cheatham et al., supra note 9, at 2 (“Professor Nussbaum, unlike some of the 
American realists, has never considered statistics as of more than auxiliary importance.”); Fact 
Research in Law, supra note 7, at 208–19 (identifying statistics as the “main” and 
“paramount” problem and attacking the “popular superstition” and “indiscriminate 
enthusiasm for statistics in legal science” resulting in “a rampant ‘rage du nombre’”). 
 17.  DIE RECHTSTATSACHENFORSCHUNG, supra note 9, at 5–6 (insisting that “methods 
of natural scientific inquiry, indeed of any causal inquiry, cannot be methods of 
jurisprudence”). 
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tradition, distinct and independent from economics.18 It was meant 
to robustly inform legal decision-making, not to answer basic social 
science questions. So while legal fact research frankly acknowledged 
its intellectual heritage,19 it meant a genuinely legal heritage—“[a]t 
all times, legal writings have referred to economic and other social 
factors. . . . [T]heir references to factual elements were incidental in 
nature . . . . The call for fact research per se and in all fields of the law 
is of recent date.”20 
This reference to (and reverence for) “legal” writings rather than 
those of theory-testing social sciences emphasized a notably different 
approach from concurrent U.S. legal realism.21 Using a distinction 
suggested by Mark Suchman in discussing this Article,22 one could 
say that if “the law” is a network of words and actions affecting each 
other (with four basic causal relationships imaginable in a 2x2 
typology), then legal fact research is concerned less with the effect of 
actions upon actions (when compared with U.S. legal realism) or 
with the effect of words upon words (when compared with academic 
linguistics), but focuses more on the “off-diagonal” cases in which 
words and actions interact, making causal claims notoriously 
difficult, if not futile altogether. 
This focus may have resulted in Nussbaum’s more pragmatic and 
less epistemological approach to empiricism from the very start, and 
it can even be traced in current schools of German empirical legal 
research, as we will argue later. Hence “legal fact research” became 
something like a proprietary label for a certain type of non-doctrinal-
but-legal inquiry that was systematic rather than incidental—but 
 
 18.  Id. at 6–8 (“There can be no talk of transferring subject matter of economics into 
legal research . . . . The approach in these two subject areas is so different in essence . . . that 
large areas of economics must remain out of consideration for actual legal work.”). 
 19.  Fact Research in Law, supra note 7, at 197 (“There is nothing brand new about 
fact research in law.”). 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  See Rheinstein, supra note 8, at 252 (“German legal scholars have . . . never 
confined themselves to an art of prophesying what judges are likely to do.”); id. at 252 n.87 
(“The continental legal scholar reflects in advance on new problems which were never before 
decided by the Codes or the courts. He leads the practice. The Anglo-American text-book 
writer and teacher of law is inclined to confine himself to expounding what the courts did in 
the past.”). 
 22.  See Mark C. Suchman, The Power of Words: A Comment on Hamann and Vogel, 
2017 BYU L. REV. 1751. 
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emphatically distinct from “empirical” research. This was true both 
in Germany and in the United States, where “the value of legal fact 
research, which has so successfully been undertaken in this country 
in recent years, can be fully appreciated without subscribing to the 
realist doctrines as such and without stressing the empirical character 
of legal science to the exclusion of the other components of law.”23 
This specific understanding of legal fact research later blurred 
amid the 1970s flood of sociological inquiries into law, known as 
Rechtssoziologie in Germany or as “law and society,” “legal 
sociology,” or “sociolegal studies” in English-speaking jurisdictions. 
Legal sociologists in Germany broadened Rechtstatsachenforschung 
to include any of their non-theoretical endeavors.24 By the mid-
1980s, it had lost most of its discriminatory power, being variably 
employed as a synonym for empirical legal research as a whole, or as 
a generic term for different empirical approaches, or as a label for 
one particular approach.25 Nowadays, legal fact research commonly 
denotes “observational studies with descriptive intentions and near-
exclusive reliance on descriptive statistics.”26 
As “genuinely legal” empirical research struggled with its identity 
in Germany, it received new momentum on the other side of the 
Atlantic: a “new legal empiricism” developed from 1996 to 1997 
onward, with Empirical Legal Studies (ELS) and New Legal Realism 
(NLR) trying “to legitimate empirical research within the legal 
academy itself”27 by “reinserting empirical social science into the 
legal academy—not necessarily in the original idiom of the social 
 
 23.  Jacoby, supra note 13, at 529; see also Fact Research in Law, supra note 7, at 197; 
Manfred Rehbinder, The Development and Present State of Fact Research in Law in the United 
States, 24 J. LEGAL EDUC. 567, 567 (1972) (noting that “[n]on-doctrinal research includes 
empirical research, fact-research, behavior- and fact-inquiry”). 
 24.  See Alfons Bora, Sociology of Law in Germany: Reflection and Practice, 43 J.L. & 
SOC’Y 619, 626 (2016) (discussing the “schism in thematic orientation between empirical 
legal research (Rechtstatsachenforschung) and sociological theory of law, which has become a 
powerful part of the official narrative of the field” (footnote omitted)). 
 25.  See Bora, supra note 24, at 638 (noting the “semantic and conceptual fuzziness” of 
sociological empirical research in law); Riegert, supra note 12, at 7 (“It has been described as 
‘non-doctrinal research’; ‘fact (or social-fact) research in law’; ‘social-science research in law’; 
‘research about law’; ‘experimental, empirical, field, or quantitative research’; ‘law-related 
research’; ‘research in law and society’; ‘research in legal sociology,’ and ‘interdisciplinary 
legal research.’”). 
 26.  EVIDENZBASIERTE JURISPRUDENZ, supra note 2, at 41 n.258. 
 27.  Suchman & Mertz, supra note 3, at 556. 
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sciences, but in a dialect that the legal academy might actually be 
willing to hear.”28 Behind this general mission united a vast and 
varied following, so twenty years later the literature on empirical 
studies in law and their epistemological challenges is boundless.29 
Apart from various methodological concerns, one issue seems to be 
particularly dear to the hearts of those who reflect on the 
new empiricism: 
The issue of translation between law and social science is a core 
issue . . . . Our goal is to create translations of social science that 
will be useful even to legal academics and lawyers who do not wish 
to perform empirical research themselves, while also encouraging 
translations of legal issues that will help social scientists gain a more 
sophisticated understanding of how law is understood “from the 
inside” by those with legal training.30 
This new empiricism fully hit Continental European shores in 
2016 with the first Conference on Empirical Legal Studies in Europe 
(CELSE) conference held in Amsterdam.31 Most recently, the 
German-based Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 
(JITE) hosted a conference on “Empirical Methods for the Law” 
(Syracuse, 7–9 June 2017) where eminent empirical legal scholars 
from the United States and Germany took a step back from the 
 
 28.  Id. at 565. 
 29.  For textbooks and handbooks, see EMPIRICAL LEGAL ANALYSIS: ASSESSING THE 
PERFORMANCE OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (Yun-chien Chang ed., 2014); ROBERT M. LAWLESS 
ET AL., EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW (2010); THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL RESEARCH (Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer eds., 2010). For reviews, see Michael 
Adler & Jonathan Simon, Stepwise Progression: The Past, Present, and Possible Future of 
Empirical Research on Law in the United States and the United Kingdom, 41 J. LAW & SOC’Y 
173 (2014); Suchman & Mertz, supra note 3; Kathryn Zeiler, The Future of Empirical Legal 
Scholarship: Where Might We Go from Here?, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 78 (2016). 
 30.  Howard Erlanger et al., Is It Time For a New Legal Realism?, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 
335, 336; Suchman & Mertz, supra note 3, at 559 (stating that with a similar objective, albeit 
less epistemological reserve, “an ELS framing would reach out to the legal academy’s 
traditional constituencies, highlighting a study’s usefulness to practicing attorneys, relevance to 
judges and legislators, or bearing on doctrinal conundrums—and soft-pedaling any disciplinary 
debates that legal audiences might consider overly arcane”). 
 31.  See First Conference on Empirical Legal Studies in Europe (CELSE), UNIV. 
AMSTERDAM, http://celse2016.acle.nl/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2018). The next CELSE will 
take place in Leuven Belgium, in May 2018. See Conference on Empirical Legal Studies in 
Europe 2018, KU LEUVEN, www.law.kuleuven.be/pub/en/cltej/CELSE (last visited Jan. 
19, 2018). 
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statistical sophistication into which empirical legal research has 
matured, and returned to the question that had been central to 
Nussbaum even one hundred years ago: “Could there be empirical 
methods that are specific for legal research?”32 In Germany, such 
renewed interest met with a new paradigm to think about legal 
meta-empiricism, Evidence-Based Jurisprudence. 
B. Evidence-Based Approaches to Law 
Considering its name, evidence-based jurisprudence might be 
mistaken for one of various other research strands that used similar 
vocabulary. To clearly distinguish these strands, it is helpful to revisit 
the etymology of the term “evidence-basing” and its history in 
medical research. 
In 1992, a group of Canadian doctors noticed a massive 
disconnect between the fast-growing clinical and epidemiological 
research evidence on the one hand and patient treatment on the 
other, which was still largely based on doctors’ rule-of-thumb 
experience and intuitive wisdoms. As a remedy, these doctors 
proposed translation procedures collectively called “evidence-based 
medicine” (EBM),33 a term that was soon applied to legal practice 
concerning medical issues as well.34 But the moniker’s journey did 
not end there. As it travelled on, its distinctiveness waned, just like 
“legal fact research” had done a couple of decades earlier. By 2005, 
an “evidence-based law approach” had appeared in the legal 
literature as an “inspiration” from medicine to promote “a 
systematization and verification of knowledge about legal 
doctrine.”35 In subsequent years, authors from Canada, the 
Netherlands, and the United States coined similar composites of 
 
 32.  Invitation Email by Conference Convener Christoph Engel (Dec. 2016) (on file 
with author). Conference contributions are forthcoming in 174 J. INSTITUTIONAL & 
THEORETICAL ECON. (forthcoming 2018); See also a German report by Hanjo Hamann, 
Empirische Methoden für die Rechtswissenschaft. 35. Jahrestagung für juristische 
Institutionenökonomik vom 7. bis 10. Juni 2017, in Siracusa (Sizilien), 72 JURISTENZEITUNG 
[JZ] (forthcoming 2018). 
 33.  Evidence-Based Med. Working Grp., Evidence-based Medicine: A New Approach to 
Teaching the Practice of Medicine, 268 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2420 (1992). 
 34.  Editorial, Evidence-Based Morality, 161 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 229 (1999). 
 35.  Bernard Trujillo, Patterns in a Complex System: An Empirical Study of Valuation in 
Business Bankruptcy Cases, 53 UCLA L. REV. 357, 363 n.17 (2005). 
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“evidence-basing” and “law,” seemingly independent of each other 
and without mutual citation or acknowledgement.36 
This disjointed development resulted in an equally disjointed 
usage of its central concept. Far from denoting a common agenda, 
the “evidence-based” label was used by lawyers for at least three 
distinct concepts: 
(1) creating and applying legal rules as informed by legal fact 
research37 or empirical legal scholarship,38 
(2) studying quantitatively how lawyers create and apply legal 
rules by “treating doctrine as a quantitative unit,”39 and 
(3) having law-makers embrace “legal experimentalism,”40 i.e., 
“that laws and policy initiatives are to be supported by 
research evidence and that policies are preferably introduced 
on a trial and error basis.”41 
This proliferation of very different ideas related to the goal of 
putting more empirical systematicity and scientific rigor into law 
hampered the usefulness of the “evidence-based” label as applied to 
law. As Mark Suchman observed in discussing this Article, 
“[P]articularly in thinking about things like ‘empirical’ . . . the 
potential for misunderstandings over words having multiple 
meanings in different settings is fairly large.”42 Hence one of the 
 
 36.  Rob van Gestel, Evidence-Based Lawmaking and the Quality of Legislation 
Regulatory Impact Assessments in the European Union and the Netherlands, in STATE 
MODERNIZATION IN EUROPE 139 (Heinz Schäffer & Julia Iliopoulos-Strangas eds., 2007); 
R.J. Cook et al., Emergency Contraception, Abortion and Evidence-Based Law, 93 INT’L J. 
GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 191 (2006); Kevin E. Davis, Legal Universalism: Persistent 
Objections, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 537, 548 (2010); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Evidence-Based Law, 
96 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 919 (2011). 
 37.  Cook et al., supra note 36, at 192–93. 
 38.  Rachlinski, supra note 36, at 904–05; see also Richard A. Posner, The State of Legal 
Scholarship Today: A Comment on Schlag, 97 GEO. L.J. 845, 852 (2009) (even earlier, explicitly 
calling ELS an “analogy” to evidence-based medicine “in placing law on a solid 
empirical basis”). 
 39.  Trujillo, supra note 35, at 363. 
 40.  Davis, supra note 36, at 548 (defining legal experimentalism as “a call for law-
making to be based on evidence showing which legal instruments work and which 
ones don’t”). 
 41.  Van Gestel, supra note 36, at 142. 
 42.  Mark Suchman, Address at Inaugural BYU Law and Corpus Linguistics Conference 
(Feb. 2016). See generally Suchman, supra note 22.  
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present authors recently undertook not only to review the usages of 
the term “evidence-basing” in law but also to analyze more precisely 
what medical practitioners actually meant by “evidence-basing” and 
whether their specific ideas might be useful for the law.43 
C. Evidence-Based Jurisprudence 
Evidence-based jurisprudence in the previously introduced sense 
starts by asking for conceptual overlaps between legal and medical 
practice, hence realizing 
that jurisprudence and medicine share a common epistemological 
perspective: ‘The subject is called Jurisprudence, not Jurisscience. 
The practice of law [. . .] is thus obviously closely related to the 
two other major practical disciplines, technology and medicine.’ 
Lawyers like doctors are interested in reality (only) insofar as their 
practical decision-making requires. Also, lawyers and doctors both 
deal with pathological cases. . . and cannot defer their decision until 
reality is fully understood.44 
Starting from these parallels and the pragmatism that both 
disciplines require in their quest for empirical data, evidence-based 
jurisprudence takes medicine’s concept of “evidence-basing” 
seriously in its own right, not merely watered down to a metaphor 
for empirical research, as was previously done. The novel 
contribution then is to analyze and potentially adapt the 
“tremendous substance and discipline” of “[e]vidence-based 
practice[s]” to enrich legal studies.45 In line with this praxeological 
impetus, the first distinction transferred from evidence-based practice 
into jurisprudence was one between the “‘doing’ mode,” 
the  “‘using’ mode” and the “‘replicating’ mode” of empirical 
 
 43.  EVIDENZBASIERTE JURISPRUDENZ, supra note 2; see also Hanjo Hamann, 
Empirische Erkenntnisse in juristischen Ausbildungsarbeiten. Prüfungsschema, Zitier- und 
Arbeitshilfen für das Jurastudium und danach [Empirical Findings in Legal Examinations. A 
Test Checklist, Citation and Writing Aids for Legal Studies and Afterwards], 39 JURISTISCHE 
AUSBILDUNG [JURA] 759 (2017) (summarizing evidence-based methods for 
educational purposes). 
 44.  EVIDENZBASIERTE JURISPRUDENZ, supra note 2, at 7–8 (citing DAS PROPRIUM 
DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT, at ix (Christoph Engel & Wolfgang Schön eds. 2007). 
 45.  Denise M. Rousseau, 2005 Presidential Address: Is There Such a Thing as “Evidence-
Based Management”?, 31 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 256, 258 (2006). 
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research46—a distinction later mirrored in the “doer, user, . . . critic” 
typology by Shari Diamond.47 
Each of these modes requires different tools. For instance, given 
that most lawyers—just as most doctors—will not be able to produce 
empirical research according to empirical state-of-the-art standards,48 
their most promising strategy will resemble evidence-based 
medicine’s five-step procedure to (1) ask for, (2) access, (3) appraise, 
(4) apply, and (5) assess empirical evidence gathered elsewhere.49 
Thus, evidence-based jurisprudence is not merely another strand of 
empirical inquiry but actually meta-empiricism in the “using” mode 
(Rezeption), which observes primary empirical research and distils 
overarching findings that can reliably inform judicial practice.50 
Despite its inspiration from medicine, evidence-based juris-
prudence rests on the shoulders of empirilegal theorizing and overtly 
acknowledges this fact.51 Like earlier approaches,52 evidence-based 
jurisprudence seeks to provide a genuinely legal interface that does 
not threaten the identity of legal academia or “require[] law 
professors to exit the library . . . to conduct their scholarship.”53 Like 
 
 46.  Sharon E. Straus & Finlay A. McAlister, Evidence-Based Medicine: a Commentary 
on Common Criticisms, 163 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 837, 837, 839 (2000) (noting that 
“[a]lthough a minority of practitioners of evidence-based medicine also do research, its 
practice is . . . not a method for performing research”). 
 47.  Shari Seidman Diamond, Empirical Marine Life in Legal Waters: Clams, Dolphins, 
and Plankton, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 803, 807–08. 
 48.  Suchman & Mertz, supra note 3, at 566 (“Legal academics must train future 
lawyers, advise sitting policy makers, and assimilate an ongoing stream of daily legal 
developments. Within this world, even dual-degree social scientists find that shortened time 
lines and limited external funding opportunities make the standards of ‘normal social science’ 
difficult to meet.”); cf. Zeiler, supra note 29 (for currently suggested remedies). 
 49.  Chris Del Mar et al., Teaching Evidence Based Medicine Should Be Integrated into 
Current Clinical Scenarios, 329 BRIT. MED. J. 989 (2004); cf. William Rosenberg & Anna 
Donald, Evidence Based Medicine: An Approach to Clinical Problem-Solving, 310 BRIT. MED. J. 
1122 (1995) (for an earlier four-step procedure). 
 50.  Hanjo Hamann, Unpacking the Board: A Comparative and Empirical Perspective on 
Groups in Corporate Decision-Making, 11 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1 (2014) [hereinafter 
Unpacking the Board] (spelling out a sample application of evidence-based methods, based on 
a chapter from EVIDENZBASIERTE JURISPRUDENZ, supra note 2). 
 51.  EVIDENZBASIERTE JURISPRUDENZ, supra note 2, at VII (“Research requires firm 
foothold on the shoulders of the proverbial Giant. . . . The present treatise is no  exception.”). 
 52.  See supra Section II.A. 
 53.  Suchman & Mertz, supra note 3, at 566 (earlier approaches included “the legal 
process school, critical legal studies, feminist legal theory, critical race theory, law and 
economics”); EVIDENZBASIERTE JURISPRUDENZ, supra note 2, at 32 (noting that evidence-
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the most recent brand of U.S. legal empiricism, which “turned to 
the pragmatist tradition in philosophy,”54 evidence-based 
jurisprudence also emphasizes its pragmatic origins.55 
As far as meta-empiricism relies on gathering and appraising 
empirical evidence, evidence-based medicine introduced a rule-of-
thumb hierarchy of five evidence “levels,”56 preferring controlled 
randomized trials (i.e., large-sample field experiments) and meta-
analyses (i.e., “the statistical analysis of statistical analyses”)57 over 
other ways of gathering empirical data. Insofar as these are lacking, 
however, any rigorous and replicable empirical study is assumed to 
outperform (or at least usefully complement) the lowest evidence 
level “mechanism-based reasoning,” i.e., experiential judgment.58 
Building on and going beyond these learnings of evidence-based 
medicine, law can develop its own canon of pragmatic rules-of-
thumb to guide meta-empirical inquiry. Seven such rules were 
previously proposed:59 
(1) All empirical research is implicitly normative. 
(2) Careful study design trumps statistical sophistication. 
(3) Without hypotheses, there are no results. 
(4) Results are not in the significance, but in the effect size. 
(5) A picture tells more than a thousand significances. 
 
based jurisprudence generally “enables access to empirical research from a specifically legal 
perspective, while letting legal researchers use their traditional mode of operation as far 
as possible”). 
 54.  Suchman & Mertz, supra note 3, at 561. 
 55.  EVIDENZBASIERTE JURISPRUDENZ, supra note 2, at 15, 18–19, 53–55. 
 56.  Jeremy Howick et al., OCEBM Levels of Evidence Working Grp., Oxford Centre 
for Evidence-Based Medicine 2011 Levels of Evidence, CEBM.NET, http://www.cebm.net/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/CEBM-Levels-of-Evidence-2.1.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2018). 
 57.  PAUL D. ELLIS, THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO EFFECT SIZES: STATISTICAL POWER, 
META-ANALYSIS, AND THE INTERPRETATION OF RESEARCH RESULTS 94 (2010); cited by 
Unpacking the Board, supra note 50, at 30 (explaining that “[t]he process of meta-analysis 
helps identify bias . . . [and] may also increase the statistical power to detect small effects and 
reduce the reliance on fickle significance levels by estimating standardized effect sizes. In short, 
it systematizes literature reviews and remedies a number of shortcomings of the research and 
publication process.”). 
 58.  Howick et al., supra note 56.  
 59.  EVIDENZBASIERTE JURISPRUDENZ, supra note 2, at 106–26. 
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(6) Statistics must not be magic, but ought to be MAGIC.60 
(7) Synthesis trumps primary research, meta-analyses trump 
narrative reviews. 
Generalizing from these and other evidence-based practices, 
three features of the evidence-based jurisprudence approach stand 
out: it emphasizes the political embeddedness of empirical issues and 
the importance of theory (rules 1–3); it advocates a pragmatic 
approach to empirical practices, explicitly assessing their actual impact 
(rules 4–6); and it adopts an observational big data strategy by 
preferring cumulated research over salient yet eclectic findings (rule 
7). These three features can also be identified in another empirical 
research tradition hailing from Germany, namely Legal Linguistics,61 
which is why a collaboration between the two research traditions has 
proven fruitful and provides an intriguing future perspective.62 
III. LEGAL LINGUISTICS 
Legal Linguistics is a theoretical and empirical research approach 
in the wider field of “law and language” research. It originated in 
Germany (Section B), where most of its historical roots can be found 
(Section A). In the wake of globalization and digitalization, it 
developed a distinctly big data (corpus) driven approach (Section C) 
that is beginning to coalesce with empirical legal research 
more generally.63 
A. Origins: Analyzing the Medium of Social Regulation 
Law lives in language. We cannot speak about legal norms 
without acknowledging that they are constructed by and through 
speech and texts. In fact, reflections on the relationship between 
signs and societal norms are even older than modern constitutional 
states: Plato’s philosophical text Phaedrus (fourth century B.C.) 
features a dialogue about whether speech and written papyrus can 
 
 60.  See ROBERT P. ABELSON, STATISTICS AS PRINCIPLED ARGUMENT (1995) 
(developing five “MAGIC” criteria for convincing statistical analyses: Magnitude, Articulation, 
Generality, Interestingness, and Credibility). 
 61.  See infra Part III. 
 62.  See infra Part IV. 
 63.  See infra Part IV. 
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appropriately communicate “the Good” in general and effectively 
regulate the polis (city-state) in particular.64 Plato despised scriptures 
because he considered them prone to misunderstandings; only 
speech and oral dialogues were deemed fit for the dialectics of truth. 
Ever since this Platonic account, the medium of law—i.e., 
language—was often criticized (in the sense of Kant) both from the 
perspective of experts (lawyers, politicians, academics, theologians) 
and that of laypeople.65 
The most important steps towards modern legal linguistics were 
taken in eighteenth and nineteenth century German feudal states. 
Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779–1861), founder of the German 
Historical School of Jurisprudence, wrote that “both law and 
language live in the soul of people.”66 He and others, like jurist 
Joseph von Sonnenfels (1732–1817) and linguist Johann Christoph 
Adelung (1732–1806), developed a new style of official language 
(Geschäftsstil) to improve the linguistic quality of statutes, 
administrative decisions, etc.67 So-called “style guides” (Stillehren) 
greatly impacted the education of jurists and administrators.68 
One of Savigny’s disciples, famous lawyer-philologist Jacob 
Grimm (1785–1863), also pioneered the empirical lexicography of 
legal language.69 One of Grimm’s most important monographs was 
the first grammar of legal language.70 Another contained a collection 
(corpus) of “wisdoms” (Weisthümer) that documented oral traditions 
of legal communication in the past, serving as a historical basis for 
 
 64.  See PLATO, PHAEDRUS (James H. Nichols Jr. trans., 1998). 
 65.  For details, see Friedemann Vogel, Rechtslinguistik: Bestimmung einer Fachrichtung, 
HANDBUCH SPRACHE IM RECHT 209 (Ekkehard Felder & Friedemann Vogel eds., 2017). See 
also various contributions on Legal Language in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE 
AND LAW, supra note 4. 
 66.  FREDERICK CHARLES VON SAVIGNY, OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR 
LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE 52 (Abraham Hayward trans., 1831). 
 67.  See Bernhard Asmuth, Geschäftsstil. Seine Prägung durch Sonnenfels und Adelung 
um 1784, HISTORISCHE RECHTSSPRACHE DES DEUTSCHEN 175 (Andreas Deutsch ed., 2013). 
 68.  Gernot Kocher, Rechtsvereinheitlichung und Rechtssprache von Maria Theresia bis 
Franz Joseph I, HISTORISCHE RECHTSSPRACHE DES DEUTSCHEN, supra note 67, at 207. 
 69.  See Heino Speer, Das Deutsche Rechtswörterbuch. Historische Lexikographie einer 
Fachsprache, LEXICOGRAPHICA 85 (Antonín Kučera et al. eds., 1989). 
 70.  JACOB GRIMM, DEUTSCHE RECHTSALTERTHÜMER (Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft 1965) (1899); see Ruth Schmidt-Wiegand, Deutsche Sprachgeschichte und 
Rechtsgeschichte bis zum Ende des Mittelalters, SPRACHGESCHICHTE 73-4 (Werner Besch et al. 
eds., 2d ed. 1998). 
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further empirical studies.71 Such historical lexicography of legal 
language continues to this day, with its most important heirs being 
the “German Law Dictionary” (Deutsches Rechtswörterbuch, DRW) 
established in 1896/97,72 and the “Concise Dictionary of German 
Legal History” (Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, 
HRG) established in 1971.73 
B. Modern Legal Linguistics 
After these early forays into empirical lexicography, modern 
linguistic approaches to law really took off starting in 1953 with 
philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein’s famous treatise initiating the 
pragmatic turn in linguistics.74 This fundamental change in the 
research perspective on language in general (and legal language in 
particular) led to law being considered, no longer as a system of 
isolated (“autopoietic”) structures, but as a social practice with and 
within texts, taking place in the context of complex institutions. This 
view emphasized social roles of specific actors, considered their 
interactions with texts, and analyzed the structure of these 
interactions, thereby describing legal interpretation methods, 
communication routines in courts, and the creation of statutes as 
specialized text genres. 
The legal implications of this new view began to be fully realized 
(and elaborated) by lawyers and linguists in the 1960s. In Germany, 
for instance, one law professor made his career on a monograph 
titled “Normative structure and normativity” (196). In this treatise, 
Friedrich Müller laid the foundations for a theory that he later 
continuously refined and developed: “Structuring Legal Theory” 
(Strukturierende Rechtslehre).75 While still claiming to be a “work in 
progress,” this theory has exerted demonstrable influence in legal 
 
 71.  JACOB GRIMM, WEISTHÜMER (Göttingen, Dieterichschen Buchhandlung 1866). 
 72.  See DAS DEUTSCHE RECHTSWÖRTERBUCH: PERSPEKTIVEN [DRW] (Andreas 
Deutsch ed. Heidelberg Univ., Winter 2010), www.rzuser.uni-heidelberg.de/~cd2/drw. 
 73.  See HANDWÖRTERBUCH ZUR DEUTSCHEN RECHTSGESCHICHTE [HRG] (2017), 
www.hrgdigit al.de. 
 74.  LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe 
trans., MacMillan Co. 1953). 
 75.  FRIEDRICH MÜLLER, STRUKTURIERENDE RECHTSLEHRE (Duncker & Humblot, 
Berlin 1984, 2d ed. 1994). For an informative excerpt translated into English, see Friedrich 
Müller, Basic Questions of Constitutional Concretization, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 325, 331 (2000). 
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theorizing in France, Spain, South Africa, Brazil, and even the 
United States.76 It essentially describes a structural model of legal 
argumentation that includes social facts and empirical findings as 
essential building blocks in speaking about—and thereby 
establishing—law: 
Starting from the facts of the case, the interpreter singles out those 
written rules that might apply. Text and case together allow him to 
develop the pertinent rule, which typically is more precise than the 
written rule.77 
In a way, this methodology implements linguistic pragmatism, 
despite having been developed prior to encountering the pragmatic 
turn in linguistics.78 At the same time, it also speaks to legal realist 
audiences: “The interpreter is not only allowed to—but even asked 
to—look at reality when making up the rule. . . . It would certainly 
be a challenging task to contrast it with American realism and 
its aftermath.”79 
In 1984, Friedrich Müller (based in Heidelberg) and linguist 
Rainer Wimmer (from Trier) founded the “Heidelberg Working 
Group on Legal Linguistics,” now headed by one of the contributors 
to this Article. Today, the group remains the oldest and most 
influential working group on legal linguistics in Germany, consisting 
of about forty lawyers, linguists, philosophers, and media scientists. 
It meets four times a year to discuss current research in progress and 
has jointly authored numerous interdisciplinary monographs and 
research articles, most at the Duncker & Humblot Publishing 
House.80 Other interdisciplinary working groups in Germany were 
founded more recently, such as one at the Berlin-Brandenburg 
Academy of Sciences (2001–2005), one at Regensburg University 
 
 76.  See Hanjo Hamann, Strukturierende Rechtslehre als juristische Sprachtheorie, 
HANDBUCH SPRACHE IM RECHT 175 (Ekkehard Felder & Friedemann Vogel eds., 2017); 
Friedemann Vogel et al., Computer-Assisted Legal Linguistics: Corpus Analysis as a New Tool for 
Legal Studies, LAW & SOC. INQUIRY (forthcoming 2018) [hereinafter Corpus Analysis] (each 
introducing the theory with a graphical illustration). For an example of South African and U.S. 
reception, see Müller, supra note 75. 
 77.  Christoph Engel, The International Bookshelf, 18 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 266, 267 
(1990) (book review). 
 78.  See MÜLLER, supra note 75, at 374 (cited in Hamann, supra note 76, at 180). 
 79.  Engel, supra note 77, at 267–68. 
 80.  For relevant references, see Hamann, supra note 76, at 184–86 (“Literatur”). 
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(around 2004), and one at the University of Halle-
Wittenberg (2008).81 
Regarding the substance matter of linguistic analyses of law, it is 
useful to distinguish two research strands that often get conflated in 
English nomenclature: legal linguistics (Rechtslinguistik) and forensic 
linguistics (forensische Linguistik). The latter refers to a sub-discipline 
of variational and applied linguistics, developing qualitative and 
computer supported methods of authorship detection.82 It typically 
studies everyday speech and text types like blackmail letters or voice 
records, aiming to improve the precision of authorship identification 
techniques; other methods (such as text type modelling, corpus 
building, and voice recognition) mainly serve auxiliary functions for 
this main task. Unlike forensic linguistics, legal linguistics is a 
specialized variety of communication studies. Legal linguists explore 
the relationship of legal practice and language as its own end, 
studying terminology and grammar, speech theories, semiotics and 
interpretation methods of law, discourse structures in courts, 
creation of statutes, or genesis of legal norms in general, for instance. 
The current state of legal linguistics research in Germany can be 
characterized by three observations. 
First, legal linguistics research in Germany tends to be national. 
Although its subject becomes increasingly transnational and 
multilingual, there is very little exchange with legal linguistics of 
other countries. This is evident by just glancing over recent 
handbooks and introductions on legal linguistics.83 
Second, some areas of legal linguistics research in Germany have 
been more exposed to empirical research than others. For instance, 
much research has been done on lexical and grammatical 
characteristics of legal language,84 interpretation methods in law and 
 
 81.  See Vogel, supra note 65, at 215–16. 
 82.  EILIKA FOBBE, FORENSISCHE LINGUISTIK: EINE EINFÜHRUNG (2011). 
 83.  E.g., HANDBUCH SPRACHE IM RECHT (Ekkehard Felder & Friedemann Vogel eds., 
De Gruyter, Berlin 2017); MONIKA RATHERT, SPRACHE UND RECHT (Winter, Heidelberg 
Univ., 2006) (German discourse), Tiersma & Solan, supra note 4 (Anglo-American discourse). 
 84.  Bernd Jeand’Heur, Die neuere Fachsprache der juristischen Wissenschaft seit der Mitte 
des 19. Jahrhunderts unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Verfassungsrecht 
und  Rechtsmethodik, FACHSPRACHEN: EIN INTERNATIONALES HANDBUCH ZUR 
FACHSPRACHENFORSCHUNG UND TERMINOLOGIEWISSENSCHAFT 1286 (Lothar Hoffmann et 
al. eds., 1998). 
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legal semantics,85 argumentation, decision making and semantic 
struggles,86 discourse between professionals and laypeople in courts 
and administration,87 and improving textual comprehensibility and its 
limitations.88 Gaps remain in building a consistent model of legal text 
genres;89 in transnational law and multilingualism in Europe;90 in the 
 
 85.  DIETRICH BUSSE, TEXTINTERPRETATION: SPRACHTHEORETISCHE GRUNDLAGEN 
EINER EXPLIKATIVEN SEMANTIK (1992); DIETRICH BUSSE, RECHT ALS TEXT: LINGUISTISCHE 
UNTERSUCHUNGEN ZUR ARBEIT MIT SPRACHE IN EINER GESELLSCHAFTLICHEN 
INSTITUTION (1992); DIETRICH BUSSE, JURISTISCHE SEMANTIK: GRUNDFRAGEN DER 
JURISTISCHEN INTERPRETATIONSTHEORIE IN SPRACHWISSENSCHAFTLICHER SICHT (2d ed. 
2010); ZUGÄNGE ZUR RECHTSSEMANTIK: INTERDISZIPLINÄRE ANSÄTZE IM ZEITALTER DER 
MEDIATISIERUNG ZWISCHEN INTROSPEKTION UND AUTOMATEN (Friedemann Vogel ed., 
2015) [hereinafter ZUGÄNGE ZUR RECHTSSEMANTIK]. 
 86.  THOMAS COENDET, RECHTSVERGLEICHENDE ARGUMENTATION (2012); 
EKKEHARD FELDER, JURISTISCHE TEXTARBEIT IM SPIEGEL DER ÖFFENTLICHKEIT (2003); 
HANS KUDLICH & RALPH CHRISTENSEN, DIE METHODIK DES BGH IN STRAFSACHEN (2009) 
[hereinafter DIE METHODIK DES BGH]; Hans Kudlich & Ralph Christensen, Die Kanones der 
Auslegung als Hilfsmittel für die Entscheidung von Bedeutungskonflikten, JURISTISCHE 
ARBEITSBLÄTTER 74 (2004); FRIEDRICH MÜLLER ET AL., RECHTSTEXT UND TEXTARBEIT 
(1997); RALPH CHRISTENSEN, WAS HEISST GESETZESBINDUNG? EINE RECHTSLINGUISTISCHE 
UNTERSUCHUNG (1989); Ekkehard Felder, Semantische Kämpfe außerhalb und innerhalb des 
Rechts, 49 DER STAAT 543 (2010).  
 87.  DIE SPRACHE DES RECHTS UND DER VERWALTUNG (Ingulf Radtke ed., 1981); 
LUDGER HOFFMANN, KOMMUNIKATION VOR GERICHT (1983); RECHTSDISKURSE: 
UNTERSUCHUNGEN ZUR KOMMUNIKATION IN GERICHTSVERFAHREN (Ludger Hoffmann ed., 
1989); Hans-Rüdiger Fluck, Sprachliche Aspekte der Bürger-Verwaltungs-Kommunikation–
Situationsbeschreibung und Forschungsperspektiven, 114 MUTTERSPRACHE 193 (2004). 
 88.  See Dietrich Busse, Verständlichkeit von Gesetzestexten - ein Problem der 
Formulierungstechnik?, 5 GESETZGEBUNG HEUTE (LEGES, BEM) 29 (1994); KARIN M. 
EICHHOFF-CYRUS & GERD ANTOS, VERSTÄNDLICHKEIT ALS BÜRGERRECHT?: DIE 
WRECHTS- UND VERWALTUNGSSPRACHE IN DER ÖFFENTLICHEN DISKUSSION (2008); Markus 
Nussbaumer, „Es gibt nichts Gutes, außer man tut es”–Arbeit an der Verständlichkeit von 
Gesetzestexten in der Schweizerischen Bundeskanzlei, HERMES, J. LINGUISTICS 111 (2002); 
Stephanie Thieme & Gudrun Raff, Verständlichkeit von Gesetzestexten und ihre Optimierung in 
der Praxis: Der Redaktionsstab Rechtssprache beim Bundesministerium der Justiz und für 
Verbraucherschutz, HANDBUCH SPRACHE IM RECHT 391 (Ekkehard Felder & Friedemann 
Vogel eds., 2017); RECHT VERSTEHEN: VERSTÄNDLICHKEIT, MISSVERSTÄNDLICHKEIT UND 
UNVERSTÄNDLICHKEIT VON RECHT (Kent D. Lerch ed., 2004). 
 89.  Dietrich Busse, Textsorten des Bereichs Rechtswesen und Justiz, TEXT- UND 
GESPRÄCHSLINGUISTIK 658 (Klaus Brinker et al. eds., 2000). 
 90.  FRIEDRICH MÜLLER & ISOLDE BURR, RECHTSSPRACHE EUROPAS: REFLEXION 
DER PRAXIS VON SPRACHE UND MEHRSPRACHIGKEIT IM SUPRANATIONALEN RECHT (2004); 
ISABEL SCHÜBEL-PFISTER, SPRACHE UND GEMEINSCHAFTSRECHT: DIE AUSLEGUNG DER 
MEHRSPRACHIG VERBINDLICHEN RECHTSTEXTE DURCH DEN EUROPÄISCHEN GERICHTSHOF 
(2004); Jan Engberg, Durchschaubarkeit durch Vielfalt – Vorteile eines mehrsprachigen 
Rechtssystems und ihre linguistische Beschreibung, 119 MUTTERSPRACHE 181 (2009). 
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relationship of law, media and digitalization;91 and in the creation of 
legal norms and statutes by the legislature.92 
The third observation concerns the practical impact of this 
research. Doctrinal analysis remains the mainstay of German legal 
academia, so empirical research strands are rarely perceived (let alone 
absorbed) by the field’s core authorities. Legal linguistics thus 
remains a marginalized pastime for interdisciplinary zealots rather 
than a research tradition to which university chairs might be 
designated. (To the best of our knowledge, there is no legal 
linguistics chair at any German university.) Despite the long-standing 
existence of a (somewhat lengthy) textbook on legal methodology, 
which relies heavily on pragmatist legal linguistics and has seen 
eleven editions between 1971 and 2013,93 linguistic knowledge 
barely ever infuses German legal education or vocational training. 
Given these observations, it may not be very surprising that there 
are only a few instances in which legal linguistics research finds its 
way into practice, as in the case of the Editorial Office for Legal 
Language (Redaktionsstab Rechtssprache) by Stefanie Thieme at the 
German Ministry of Justice.94 
C. Legal Linguistics in the Age of New Media and Digitalization 
Meanwhile, globalization and digitalization have changed 
research on language and law, both in Germany and elsewhere. After 
 
 91.  POLITIK, [NEUE] MEDIEN UND DIE SPRACHE DES RECHTS (Friedrich Müller ed., 
2007); THOMAS VESTING, DIE MEDIEN DES RECHTS: SCHRIFT (2011); Ralph Christensen & 
Kent D. Lerch, Ein Urteil, wie es im Buche steht. Vom Aufstieg und Niedergang des Gesetzbuchs, 
POLITIK, [NEUE] MEDIEN UND DIE SPRACHE DES RECHTS, supra at 221; Martin Morlok, 
Intertextualität und Hypertextualität im Recht, ZUGÄNGE ZUR RECHTSSEMANTIK 69 
(Friedemann Vogel ed., 2015); Jan C. Schuhr, Datenbanken gerichtlicher Entscheidungen als 
Zugang zu juristischer Semantik?, ZUGÄNGE ZUR RECHTSSEMANTIK 93 (Friedemann Vogel 
ed., 2015). 
 92.  FRIEDEMANN VOGEL, LINGUISTIK RECHTLICHER NORMGENESE: THEORIE DER 
RECHTSNORMDISKURSIVITÄT AM BEISPIEL DER ONLINE-DURCHSUCHUNG (2012) 
[hereinafter LINGUISTIK RECHTLICHER NORMGENESE]. 
 93.  FRIEDRICH MÜLLER & RALPH CHRISTENSEN, JURISTISCHE METHODIK I. 
GRUNDLEGUNG FÜR DIE ARBEITSMETHODEN DER RECHTSPRAXIS (11th ed., 2013). 
 94.  See Stephanie Thieme & Gudrun Raff, Verständlichkeit von Gesetzestexten und ihre 
Optimierung in der Praxis: Der Redaktionsstab Rechtssprache beim Bundesministerium der 
Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz, HANDBUCH SPRACHE IM RECHT 391 (Ekkehard Felder & 
Friedemann Vogel eds., 2017). 
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about twenty-five years of personal computers, the Internet, and new 
discourse media, the language of social regulation has also changed 
and found new forms of expression. We have only just begun to 
understand the present and future effects of this technological 
development on legal practice and the way that texts are used 
by lawyers.95 
One of the first tangible ambitions was for “electronic brains” to 
automate legal processes. The promise of prejudice-free, more 
objective, more predictable, more just, and less complex legal 
decision-making brought legal “cybernetics,” later called 
“informatics” (Rechtsinformatik), to the fore—analyzing legal texts, 
no longer by the handful, but in thousands and millions. As one of 
the first legal informatics projects in Germany, a research group in 
Darmstadt in the 1970s tried to develop a stable, logical, calculable 
ontology for legal interpretation.96 This turned out to be overly 
ambitious,97 and present legal informatics proceeds more carefully,98 
reflecting the limitations imposed on automation by language: 
judicial decision-making, i.e., combining texts and arguments from 
legal literature and precedents with statutes and party writs, is an 
inherently cognitive-creative endeavor. While introspection 
must  not  become the exclusive source of interpretation in 
legal  methods,  the  other extreme—replacing judges by so-called 
“subsumption  automata,” thus creating “law ex machina”99—is 
equally  unwarranted. 
German legal linguists thus prefer a middle ground: they use 
corpora to inform their analysis but continue to rely on fairly 
qualitative methods, especially hermeneutics, discourse or content 
analysis, and ethnographical studies. Most German corpora contain 
 
 95.  See discussion in Morlok, supra note 91. 
 96.  See PARAPHRASEN JURISTISCHER TEXTE (Dieter Rave et al. eds., 1971). 
 97.  See Kyriakos N. Kotsoglou, Subsumtionsautomat 2.0, 69 JURISTENZEITUNG [JZ] 
451 (2014); FRIEDEMANN VOGEL ET AL., RICHTERRECHT DER ARBEIT – EMPIRISCH 
UNTERSUCHT: MÖGLICHKEITEN UND GRENZEN COMPUTERGESTÜTZTER TEXTANALYSE 
AM  BEISPIEL DES ARBEITNEHMERBEGRIFFS 227 (2015) [hereinafter RICHTERRECHT 
DER ARBEIT]. 
 98.  See, for example, the Munich-based research group Lexalyze at www.lexalyze.de 
(last visited Jan. 20, 2018). 
 99.  OLIVER RAABE ET AL., RECHT EX MACHINA: FORMALISIERUNG DES RECHTS IM 
INTERNET DER DIENSTE (2012). 
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at most a couple hundred texts, which are then manually annotated 
and explored.100 One of the contributors to this Article, Friedemann 
Vogel, was the first to create corpora of several thousand prepared 
legal texts around 2010–2012 (especially decisions of the German 
Constitutional Court and other federal courts) and to develop an 
approach combining qualitative hermeneutics and quantitative 
methods of computational and corpus linguistics. Calculating 
recurrent speech patterns and analyzing “sediments” of legal 
semantics using big data and semi-automated algorithms101 resulted 
in a new corpus-driven macro perspective on the constitution of 
doctrine—language, knowledge, and power. Several case studies of 
this approach have been published.102 
IV. A MEETING OF THE MINDS: 
COMPUTER ASSISTED LEGAL LINGUISTICS 
As we have argued, evidence-based jurisprudence and legal 
linguistics have converged on three features: they pragmatically 
observe their discourse of interest, analyze how descriptions of social 
“reality” are normatively charged (and clandestinely assert political 
authority), and increasingly use big data methodology. Their natural 
fit on these dimensions inspired a new trans-discipline that recently 
emerged in Germany: Computer Assisted Legal Linguistics 
(CAL²).103 The name’s surface similarity with earlier “Computer-
Assisted Legal Research”104 was unintended and purely coincidental. 
 
 100.  E.g., JING LI, „RECHT IST STREIT”: EINE RECHTSLINGUISTISCHE ANALYSE DES 
SPRACHVERHALTENS IN DER DEUTSCHEN RECHTSPRECHUNG (2011); DIE METHODIK DES 
BGH, supra note 86. 
 101.  Friedemann Vogel, Das Recht im Text: Rechtssprachlicher Usus in 
korpuslinguistischer Perspektive, in KORPUSPRAGMATIK 314 (Ekkehard Felder et al. eds., 2012) 
[hereinafter Das Recht im Text]. 
 102.  See generally id.; LINGUISTIK RECHTLICHER NORMGENESE, supra note 92; 
RICHTERRECHT DER ARBEIT, supra note 97; Ekkehard Felder et al., Patientenautonomie’ und 
‚Lebensschutz’, 44 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GERMANISTISCHE LINGUISTIK 1 (2016); Friedemann 
Vogel, Das LDA-Toolkit, 57 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ANGEWANDTE LINGUISTIK 129 (2012). 
 103.  For general introductions, see Hanjo Hamann et al., Computer Assisted Legal 
Linguistics (CAL²), in 29 LEGAL KNOWLEDGE & INFORMATION SYSTEMS 195 (Floris Bex & 
Serena Villata eds., 2016) [hereinafter Computer Assisted Legal Linguistics (CAL²)]; Corpus 
Analysis, supra note 76. 
 104.  Eldridge Adams, The Move Toward Modern Data Management in the Courts, 23 U. 
FLA. L. REV. 250, 251 (1971); J. Roger Hamilton, Computer-Assisted Legal Research, 51 OR. 
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A. Conceptual Novelties of CAL² 
There are two major differences between this new approach and 
previous work: 
First, CAL² analyzes law, “its language, semantics, knowledge 
structure, and discourse patterns,” as a social praxis.105 It focusses on 
specialized legal vocabularies106 rather than ordinary language, which 
was the focus for much previous U.S. research in the plain meaning 
and original intent traditions.107 In some sense then, CAL² 
constitutes a new linguistic legal framework: where legal realists 
analyzed “what the courts . . . do in fact, and nothing more 
pretentious,”108 CAL² analyzes what judges and other jurists write 
down and how they thus exert power and authority. In this context, 
the textual work of lawyers is taken seriously and analyzed, but less as 
a source of law than as a performative speech act.109 Social practices 
that aim to change social reality often enough succeed at convincing 
or out-writing opponents. From this bird’s-eye perspective, law 
appears as “nothing more pretentious” than “sediments” of legal 
writing.110 This is distinct from plain meaning inquiry using corpora, 
but these two methods of inquiry probably differ more in their 
 
L. REV. 665 (1972); William G. Harrington, A Brief History of Computer-Assisted Legal 
Research, 77 LAW LIBR. J. 543 (1984); W. Ronald Robins, Automated Legal Information 
Retrieval, 5 HOUS. L. REV. 691, 694 (1968).  
 105.  Corpus Analysis, supra note 76, at 5. 
 106.  See Vijay K. Bhatia et al., Legal Discourse: Opportunities and Threats for Corpus 
Linguistics, in DISCOURSE IN THE PROFESSIONS: PERSPECTIVES FROM CORPUS LINGUISTICS 
203, 222 (Ulla Connor & Thomas A. Upton eds., 2004). 
 107.  See Stephen C. Mouritsen, Hard Cases and Hard Data: Assessing Corpus Linguistics 
as an Empirical Path to Plain Meaning, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 156 (2011); James 
C. Phillips et al., Corpus Linguistics & Original Public Meaning: A New Tool to Make 
Originalism More Empirical, 126 YALE L.J. F. 21 (2016); Lawrence M. Solan, Can Corpus 
Linguistics Help Make Originalism Scientific?, 126 YALE L.J. F. 57 (2016); Lawrence M. Solan 
& Tammy A. Gales, Finding Ordinary Meaning in Law: The Judge, the Dictionary or the 
Corpus?, 1 INT’L J. LEGAL DISCOURSE 253 (2016); Lee J. Strang, How Big Data Can Increase 
Originalism’s Methodological Rigor: Using Corpus Linguistics to Reveal Original Language 
Conventions, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1181 (2017). 
 108.  Such was the oft-quoted commonplace from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., supra 
note 5, at 461. 
 109.  For early accounts of performativity and law, see, for example, Michael Hancher, 
Speech Acts and the Law, in LANGUAGE USE AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 245 (Roger W. 
Shuy & Anna Shnukal eds., 1980); Henry E. Nicholson, Review, 7 PHIL. & RHETORIC 103, 
104 (1974) (reviewing WALTER PROBERT, LAW, LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATIONS (1972)).  
 110.  RICHTERRECHT DER ARBEIT, supra note 97, at 319. 
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source material (laypeople language versus expert language) than in 
their conceptual underpinnings.111 
Second, CAL² does not attempt to create machine-readable, 
algorithmic, or even cybernetic models of the law, hence restricting 
computers to assisting rather than replacing hermeneutic inquiry.112 
This connects “the micro perspective of individual cases and legal 
arguments with the macro perspective of normative structure and 
patterns in legal argumentation”113 but differs on a very basic level 
from automated content analysis114 and quantitative machine 
learning.115 In CAL², quantitative data are used merely as a starting 
point for contextual qualitative reasoning, bridging the methods and 
epistemological challenges of law and linguistics,116 thereby both 
revealing and utilizing some of their surprisingly similar features in a 
globalized world of hypertextualized mass media.117 CAL² thus 
resembles what has more recently been described as linguistically 
informed “big data legal scholarship,”118 or “‘text-as-
data’ research.”119 
 
 111.  We thank Larry Solan for answering a clarifying question to this end. 
 112.  Just as evidence-based jurisprudence did not attempt to “replace normative 
assessments” but to “underpin them empirically, viz. to ‘base them on’ evidence.” 
EVIDENZBASIERTE JURISPRUDENZ, supra note 2, at 14–15. 
 113.  Corpus Analysis, supra note 76, at 6. 
 114.  E.g., Michael Evans et al., Recounting the Courts? Applying Automated Content 
Analysis to Enhance Empirical Legal Research, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1007 (2007). 
 115.  E.g., Jonathan Macey & Joshua Mitts, Finding Order in the Morass: The Three Real 
Justifications for Piercing the Corporate Veil, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 99 (2014). 
 116.  See Friedemann Vogel, Calculating Legal Meanings? Drawbacks and Opportunities 
of Corpus Assisted Legal Linguistics to Make the Law (More) Explicit, in THE PRAGMATIC TURN 
IN LAW 287 (Dieter Stein & Janet Giltrow eds., 2017). For a similar approach, see David S. 
Law, Constitutional Archetypes, 95 TEX. L. REV. 153, 154 (2016) (analyzing “the world’s 
constitutional preambles using methods from computational linguistics”). 
 117.  Friedemann Vogel et al., “Begin at the Beginning”—Lawyers and Linguists Together 
in Wonderland, 6 INT’L J. LANGUAGE & L. 90 (2017) [hereinafter Begin at the Beginning]. 
 118.  Frank Fagan, Big Data Legal Scholarship: Toward a Research Program and 
Practitioner’s Guide, 20 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2 (2016); accord Frank Fagan, From Policy 
Confusion to Doctrinal Clarity: Successor Liability from the Perspective of Big Data, 9 VA. L. & 
BUS. REV. 391 (2015). 
 119.  Wolfgang Alschner et al., Text-as-Data Analysis of Preferential Trade Agreements: 
Mapping the PTA Landscape 4 (Ottawa Faculty of Law Working Paper No. 2017-32), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2999800 (assuming that “[t]he standardized nature of the legal 
language of international treaties provides particularly fertile ground for the deployment of 
text-as-data approaches”). 
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B. State of CAL² and its Challenges 
Specific examples of such research have been discussed at two 
international conferences in Germany: in April 2013, “Legal Corpus 
Pragmatics: How Language and Media Theory Challenge the Law” 
in Freiburg,120 and in March 2016, “The Fabric of Law and 
Language: Discovering Patterns through Legal Corpus Linguistics” 
in Heidelberg.121 Those conferences were followed by a session on 
“Computer Assisted Legal Linguistics” at the Freiburg meeting of 
the International Language and Law Association (ILLA) in 
September 2017.122 As a result of these conferences, German legal 
researchers have become interested in corpus linguistics to answer 
questions as varied as the meaning of “enterprise” (Unternehmen) in 
corporate law discourse, and empirical analyses of criminal 
statutory law.123 
One of the major challenges for computer-assisted corpus 
research in law (both in Germany and elsewhere) is to tap useful and 
reliable data sources. Commercial databases of legal text such as 
Lexis, HeinOnline, and Westlaw in the United States, or Juris, 
Jurion, and Beck Online in Germany provide plenty of relevant 
content but restrict users to limited document retrieval. They lack 
any programming interfaces required to harvest large chunks of 
“text-as-data”—which instead is usually prohibited by T&Cs—so 
they are of limited usefulness for big data research. Also, they are not 
 
 120.  For conference reports (in German), see Hanjo Hamann, Tagungsbericht: Juristische 
Korpuspragmatik, 68 JURISTENZEITUNG 829 (2013); Hanjo Hamann & Jana Werner, 
Juristische Korpuspragmatik–Konferenzbericht, 41 DEUTSCHE SPRACHE 285 (2013). Select 
conference proceedings are also documented in ZUGÄNGE ZUR RECHTSSEMANTIK, supra 
note 85. 
 121.  For a brief report, see Begin at the Beginning, supra note 117. For a more elaborate 
report (but in German), see Christoph Lukas, Korpuslinguistik und Recht, 103 ARCHIV FÜR 
RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 138 (2017). For select conference proceedings, see Hanjo 
Hamann & Friedemann Vogel, The Fabric of Language and Law—Towards an International 
Research Network for Computer Assisted Legal Linguistics (CAL²), 6 INT’L J. LANGUAGE & L. 
101 (introduction to the proceedings, which are available online at http://www.language 
andlaw.de/jll/issue/viewIssue/6/1 (last visited Jan. 20, 2018)). 
 122.  See Relaunch Conference 2017, INT’L LANGUAGE & L. ASS’N, www.illa.online 
/index.php/relaunch-conference-2017 (last visited Jan. 20, 2018). 
 123.  See Core Projects and Associated Projects, CAL2, https://www.cal2.eu/index.php
/core-projects-and-associated-projects (last visited Jan. 20, 2018) (a continuously updated list 
of projects in progress). 
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designed to balance texts on linguistically relevant dimensions, and 
they contain textual errors (which barely hamper document retrieval 
but seriously encumber any quantitative approach).124 Consequently, 
compiling research corpora has been tedious and time-consuming, as 
both contributors to this Article quickly noted—Vogel in his legal 
linguistics research and Hamann in a pioneering study of legal 
citations analysis.125 
C. Toward a Reference Corpus of Legal Language 
The previously noted challenges to corpus research in law have 
sprung the idea of creating a curated and representative reference 
corpus of German legal texts for research on legal language and 
discourses.126 This would be similar to the “Corpus of Contemporary 
American English” (COCA) commonly used in plain meaning 
inquiry,127 or its German equivalent “Deutsches Referenzkorpus” 
(DeReKo),128 but restricted to legal texts like the recently released 
“Corpus of US Supreme Court Opinions.”129 
Incidentally, such text databases for empirical analyses of 
representative samples of legal language had already been 
foreshadowed by Arthur Nussbaum. More than a century ago, he 
proposed that some central institution should collect “legally typical 
or otherwise significant contracts, statutes, broker notes, protocols, 
security forms, etc. . . . in a systematic and comprehensive 
manner.”130 Nussbaum could not have had linguistic big data analysis 
in mind, but his idea of centrally collecting representative texts that 
circulated among professional lawyers and were typical enough to 
 
 124.  See Schuhr, supra note 91. 
 125.  LINGUISTIK RECHTLICHER NORMGENESE, supra note 92; Hanjo Hamann, Die 
Fußnote, das unbekannte Wesen: Potential und Grenzen juristischer Zitationsanalyse, 5 
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 501, 533 (2014) (concluding that the study “required a three-digit 
number of working hours and an effort close to what a single individual can handle at all”). 
 126.  Das Recht im Text, supra note 101, at 319. 
 127.  CORPUS CONTEMP. AM. ENG., http://corpus.byu.edu/coca (last visited Jan. 20, 
2018); see also supra note 107. 
 128.  INSTITUT FÜR DEUTSCHE SPRACHE, https://cosmas2.ids-mannheim.de (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2018). 
 129.  CORPUS US SUP. CT. OPINIONS, http://corpus.byu.edu/scotus (last visited Jan. 
20, 2018). 
 130.  DIE RECHTSTATSACHENFORSCHUNG, supra note 9, at 21–22. 
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serve as templates for the legal language of his day came very close to 
a reference corpus as we understand it. 
In order to now finally create such a corpus, the present authors 
initiated the CAL² research group (www.cal2.eu) in 2012, funded by 
the Heidelberg Academy of Sciences. With support by colleagues 
from various disciplines in Germany and internationally, the group 
then carefully reviewed the state of the art of legal corpus research131 
and incorporated its learnings into the construction and compilation 
of its own reference corpus. As the first tier of proof-of-concept 
funding ran out in mid-2017, the German-language corpus had 
reached a size of over 6,000 statutes, some 43,000 academic papers, 
and about 370,000 case law texts of all levels of the judiciary, 
totaling over 1.3 billion tokens (words).132 These texts were 
extensively checked for errors and inconsistencies, then stored in TEI 
P5 compliant xml,133 with additional text layers containing linguistic 
annotations (parts-of-speech), and enriched with all available 
metadata.134 This corpus is now being explored by the authors and 
cooperators from various institutions in a number of projects on 
language and law.135 
The second tier of funding for the CAL² group, which might 
furnish the corpus with a graphical user interface with built-in 
statistical tools, began in May 2017. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Tracing the roots of current German corpus research to the early 
twentieth century, this Article has shown how an acute awareness of 
intellectual predecessors can inspire new and original research. Far 
 
 131.  Corpus Analysis, supra note 76 (providing a near-comprehensive survey of earlier 
European corpus projects). 
 132.  Numbers taken from the most recent annual report on the group’s activities: 
Friedemann Vogel & Hanjo Hamann, Computergestützte Rechtslinguistik (CAL²)–Das Gewirk 
von Sprache und Dogmatik des Rechts am Beispiel des JuReko-Referenzkorpus, HEIDELBERGER 
AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN: JAHRBUCH 2016, at 251, 252 (Uta Hüttig ed., 2017). 
 133.  P5 is the current version of xml structuring guidelines published by TEI, the Text 
Encoding Initiative. See TEI: P5 Guidelines, TEXT ENCODING INITIATIVE, http://www.tei-
c.org/Guidelines/P5/ (last updated Nov. 29, 2017). 
 134.  Details in a companion piece for the computer science audience: Computer Assisted 
Legal Linguistics (CAL²), supra note 103, at 196–97. 
 135.  See Core Projects and Associated Projects, supra note 123. 
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from being intellectual trivia, academic origin stories benefit a field in 
at least three ways: They foster progress by highlighting common 
roots and shared interests in seemingly disparate domains. They 
foster self-reflection by questioning the originality and novelty of 
ideas that may be traceable to even a century ago. And they foster 
interdisciplinarity by unearthing links and points of contact that got 
buried in today’s subject matter specialization. 
This Article illustrated these three benefits in the case of corpus 
research and its German incarnation called Computer Assisted Legal 
Linguistics (CAL²). Joining two different strands of research that 
each observed their discourse of interest pragmatically, all the while 
being sensitive to power implications, and preferring big data 
strategies, CAL² has resulted in a new transdiscipline that interlocks 
with similar U.S. projects. Looking back to get ahead, corpus 
research will escape from the long shadow of previous empirical 
traditions and prove to be a valuable “new tool for legal studies” in 
the toolbox of academic and practical lawyers.136 
  
 
 136. Corpus Analysis, supra note 76 (quote from title). 
5.HAMANN_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2018  4:03 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2017 
1502 
 
